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How do Indian firms cope with a crisis? - Earnings management characteristics of CNX 
Nifty 100 companies 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
An analysis of Indian CNX Nifty 100 companies uncovers the perils of opportunistic earnings 
management as crises affect balance sheets in FY2007 and FY2012, recession years around the 
Global Financial crisis. Only a small portion of the companies engage in sophisticated earnings 
management commensurate with performance.  
Operating accruals of the firm are synonymous with its Working Capital investment. These 
accruals measure Working Capital dependencies in financing growth and should instantiate on 
PPE investments. The Modified Jones model is measured for the sample of CNX 100 companies 
including Banks and a DID approach used to compare data before and after a crisis year. 
Indian firms show only a 2% level of accruals, but more than 30% firm years show significantly 
higher accruals in growth years. The study proves indications of Performance measurement 
hypothesis yet primarily only Opportunistic accruals with negative correlation between Post crisis 
and pre-crisis accruals and accruals increasing in the post crisis year.  Accruals are significantly 
incident on sales in the pre-crisis years.  
The presence of negative accruals may show effects of high growth and slack corporate 
governance. Banking firms respond with a more sophisticated earnings management strategy. 
Discretionary Loan Loss provisions significantly increase with increase in Cash profits. These 
Operating accruals of the firm are synonymous with its Working Capital investment.  
Keywords: Discretionary Accruals, Earnings Management, GFC, Global Financial Crisis, 
Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance, India, NSE 100, negative accruals  
JEL: M41, M49  
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1. Introduction  
 
India is one of the deepest Financial Markets and an attractive destination for Venture Capital and 
Private Equity (Groh et al., 2018). This study features the behavior of the 100 largest and most 
liquid NSE 100 firms from India, analyzed in the Modified Jones model used by Dechow, Sloan 
and Sweeney (1995), hereinafter referred to as DSS95. We also include Banks in our analysis for 
earnings management. Across two recessions in 2007 and 2012 recovering firms show striking 
changes in earnings management behavior revealing opportunistic behavior of firms caught in all 
its glory using a simple DID design while banks show up as sophisticated users of accrual-based 
earnings management during the same period. 
Financial reporting continues to become sophisticated and is consistently harmonized 
internationally. There is evidence, however, that firms worldwide continue to engage in accruals-
based earnings management and real activity earnings management. This also corresponds to a 
general reluctance on part of managers to report bad news and to report in line with or beating 
expectations from their own guidance and analysts’ forecasts. Accruals are a significant indicator 
of earnings quality along with persistence, smoothness, timeliness, loss avoidance and frequently 
used for verification in the literature with events of earnings restatement and enforcement actions 
by SEC(USA), SEBI(India) or other regulators (Dechow, Ge and Schrand, 2010).   
Evidence of counteracting business cycle impact on the firm is linked with both real and accrual- 
based earnings management.  However, reporting enforcement of real measures that include one-
off expenses may be unreliable and we rely on accrual-based earnings measures of earnings 
management. Recent analyses link earnings management propensity of firms with market returns 
(Li and Hwang, 2019, Dayanandan and Sra, 2018). 
Earnings management literature relies heavily on the Jones (1991) model. Different variations in 
methodology have been focused around maintaining and improving the power of the test and a 
recognition of the limitations of the test while its continuing effectiveness in isolating discretionary 
accruals. We use a sample of the 100 largest and most liquid Indian firms listed on the NSE, 
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represented in the Nifty 100 index. As of March 2018, the index represented nearly four fifths of 
the Indian market capitalization.  
Operating accruals of the firm are synonymous with its Working Capital investment.  Both 
industry-based models and the generalized models have been applied to the problem of isolating 
non-discretionary and discretionary accruals. Competing Earnings management theories can be 
variously applied and extended to therefore, forecast companies’ idiosyncratic and market wide 
responses to information flow and macroeconomic factors to its version of the truth in providing 
earnings guidance, reacting to good and bad news and creating cookie jar reserves for the future. 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) explains partly the managers’ increasing requirements 
for a discretion in reporting earnings and smoothing earnings irrespective of industry. 
The study investigates earnings management strategies of the 100 largest banks and non-financial 
companies from India and compares their reactions to financial crises to separate how many firms 
are displaying sophisticated corporate governance and following performance measurement 
hypothesis of earnings management in a larger emerging market like India with deeper Financial 
markets and a robust regulatory environment. Emerging markets have a higher average economic 
growth and growth imperatives are expected to influence firms’ earnings management strategies.  
Follow on research can show the impact of national accounting guidelines, IFRS, Guidance and 
Forecast revisions and pre-IPO or pre-merger valuation motivations on the Earnings management 
strategy of the firm and relate to its expectation management of stock returns.  Goel (2018) tests 
for MNE vs domestic difference in earnings management using reputation; Ming (2003) and 
Elleuch and Taktak(2015) use earnings management to trace the process of effectivising  corporate 
governance and regulation in an emerging economy; while Safdar and Yan (2016) and Attia, 
Lassoud & Attia (2016) recover significant managerial outcomes employing Earnings 
management models.  
1.1 Earnings management in Banks 
 
Banks have been found to exercise a similar discretion in providing and renewing Loan Loss 
Reserves to create a managerial control option in reported earnings. While current research ignores 
banks in Earnings management analysis, we collate earnings management analyses by banks and 
present a consolidated finding comparing the entire NSE 100 sample. Current research also finds 
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the role for AFS securities following on Realized gains from Securities which we also attempt as 
a proxy for Indian Banks in the Nifty 50 and Junior 50 indices. Fair value accounting is still not 
likely to show up in Indian Banks’ reported data though some data on outstanding derivatives’ 
positions is available and securitization is also expected to add more power to manage growth 
financing to banking balance sheets. Gombola, Ho and Huang (2016) have also linked the recent 
literature in leverage and liquidity to earnings and capital management.  
Othman and Mersni (2014) provide an informative analysis using Loan Loss provisions (LLPs) in 
Middle eastern banks while Ozili (2018) links Discretionary LLPs to macroeconomic progress and 
investor protection. 
1.2 Dealing with Crises 
 
Cyclical recessions and non-cyclical crisis events such as the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 
generate a similar response from firms within the means available to managers to tweak their 
financial reporting and minimize the impact of the crises on the firm’s stakeholders and future 
investing and financing activities.  We use crisis years of 2007 and 2012 to measure and report the 
earnings management activities of Indian Non-Financial Firms and Banks and review the results 
considering existing evidence and for the benefit of follow on research in the area.  The analysis 
and the literature recognizes that quarterly earnings announcements facilitate the smoother 
management of earnings management strategies but as it relies on a large sample, it expects 
sufficient power in the tests to ignore other announcement effects in a consideration of annual 
earnings announcement windows. Flores et al. (2018) and Persakis and Iatridis (2015) review the 
relationship between crises and earnings management.  
Final earnings announcements of the year are likely to be more definitive regarding the company’s 
overall earnings management intentions and avoid seasonal fluctuations.  As Indian firms follow 
an April – March Fiscal year, we also follow their March fiscal announcements. We also expect 
in general that changes in accounting guidelines over the years would have reduced overall 
opportunities for earnings management. However, the corresponding likely increase of intangible 
assets during the period would correspond to some increasing opportunity for earnings 
management as well as is visible in Table 2.  The analysis precludes the final introduction of IFRS 
as a mandatory requirement for Indian firms though internationally focused and corporate 
Earnings Management in the CNX Nifty 100 
5 
 
governance aware firms invest in IFRS based financial reporting. We also rely on a consensus that 
informativeness of Financial reporting has not decreased in the period of 2002-2015 which data 
we employ in the analysis. Seminal research in the area includes a discussion on informativeness 
in Beaver, Correia and McNichols (2009); discussion on earnings quality by Dechow, Ge and 
Schrand (2010) and the discussion by McNichols and Stubbens (2008) on the role of Earnings 
management in relation to investment activity envisaged by the firm.  
This study contributes to the literature in establishing a benchmark level of Earnings management 
in Emerging markets which at 2% verifies with other multi country studies in the area. We find 
there are no significant differences based in Industries however given that growth-oriented firms 
are creating more Earnings management, the influence of innovation-based strategies can be 
explained in Industrials and Healthcare (see Table 2) apart from the significant effect of Corporate 
Governance on Earnings management.  The study is based on 100 largest listed enterprises in India 
under the Companies Act (2013) and the relevant banking acts for listed banks. Sophisticated 
earnings management is proved by a negative correlation in larger Corporates and the Pro cyclical 
ramp up of Discretionary LLPs in banks 
The study importantly proves the opportunistic reliance of large, well-managed and established 
firms on Sales. Earnings management is related to Sales with a large coefficient that significantly 
changes signs in the crisis years. This reflects poorly on Corporate governance standards in large 
emerging markets and reflects on the requirement of investment outstripping available capital as 
managers increase profit reporting using all available cash into working capital investments 
making PPE investments a second-best priority. Earnings management is lower in larger 
companies with recognition in Corporate Governance. 
India is an investor friendly, well-regulated destination with deep Financial markets (Groh et al., 
2018). The study tries to close the gap in the higher earnings management given in the sample 
given the better standards of corporate governance visible based on compliance with international 
reporting standards and the recent outward M&A seen in such large emerging markets and 
compares Earnings management strategies of Banks in the sample(listed banks in the Nifty 100 in 
India). We find banks to be sophisticate users of earnings management, increasing LLPs during 
profitable years supported by express regulation from the RBI (Central bank). Jooste (2013) 
employs a survey to confirm the ethical issues surrounding discretionary earnings management 
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while Li, Park and Bao (2014) comment on trustworthiness of Financial reporting in Emerging 
market economies. 
The following section updates the literature review on the subject. The document proceeds to 
explain the Data and apply DID measurement with the Earnings management model to isolate the 
behavior of discretionary accruals in the designated crises years. In the end we discuss the 
conclusions from our data and the implications for the subject.  
2. Literature Review 
 
Earnings Management has been tested empirically across international accounting regimes. It is 
seen to be lower in common law countries because of better investor protection (Leuz, Nanda and 
Wysocki, 2003). Real Earnings Management becomes more possible with lower discretionary 
expenses. However, Li (2019) confirms that real and accrual-based earnings management are 
complementary. Attia, Lassoued and Attia (2016); Ahmed (2015); Safdar and Yan (2016); and 
Dayanandan and Sra (2018) comment on the accrual-based earnings management in emerging 
markets and their earnings quality, informativeness and value relevance in a growth environment.  
Asia and other higher growth countries are found to lie in an independent cluster with both civil 
and common law characteristics with significant accrual-based earnings management (ibid.). 
These dimensions in earnings management advantage from Corporate Finance literature of 
LaPorta et al (2002) relating Corporate Governance, monitoring and investor protection and legal 
frameworks in host countries.  
Accruals are frequently used for verification in the literature with events of earnings restatement 
and enforcement actions by SEC (USA), SEBI (India) or other regulators. (Dechow, Ge and 
Schrand, 2010) 
Bonus contracts necessitate earnings management in line with agency implications. Evidence of 
counteracting business cycle impact on the firm motivates it. 
The extent of earnings management using accruals may depend on the extent of ownership control 
in the company. Beating forecasts (Earnings surprise), a frequent phenomenon in India, however, 
is not seen as a motivating factor for increasing institutional ownership, as in Sen (2009).  
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Dechow et al. (2012) continue their 1995 seminal review of earnings management models in an 
effort to create a more robust test to detect earnings management by assuming the eventual reversal 
of discretionary accruals in the very next year. While the presence of a large sample in our case 
allows us to avoid making such assumptions, we expect the reversal of accruals to force ill prepared 
firms into a reactive crisis of earnings in their post crisis reports in FY 2007 and FY 2012. We rely 
on the original Modified Jones models and then separate the Discretionary accruals for the firms.   
The Jones (1991) model introduced a linear relation between Total Accruals and Changes in Sales 
and Property, Plant and Equipment. The effect of Account receivables from Credit sales is 
subsequently accounted for in the Modified Jones model by DSS95 and remains the bedrock of 
earnings management literature.  This model replaced the Total Accruals approach and Industry 
model approaches as succinctly explained in DSS95. The detailed model is presented in section 
4.3.  
While Non-discretionary accruals relate to the operating characteristics of the business, 
discretionary accruals reverse out in a few years. Corrections to the modified jones models in the 
literature by Dechow et al. (2011) incorporating reversals in the very next year and by use of 
matched firms by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) are found to be exceedingly complex without 
additional benefits of power or reliability. Other mechanisms to separate accruals also frequently 
underperform the Modified Jones model and thus the same as typified in equations (1) and (2) is 
primarily used on the sample here to separate discretionary accruals. The reversal of discretionary 
accruals in fact improves the statistical validity of the test and improves its power over a larger 
sample.   
The model remains robust and the most effective in discerning the role of accruals after controlling 
for long term growth and the return on assets. The growth variation is realized because of 
dependence of growth on the Working Capital investment outlays. The success of the Modified 
Jones model however argues that the model may be biased against growth companies seen as 
reporting higher discretionary accruals (McNichols, 2000). 
This study separates the Discretionary accruals for the firms as per the model. Using Discretionary 
accruals thus available, the literature goes on to implement market model event studies based in 
Ross’ APT in DeFond and Jimbalvo(1994) and estimate the influence of independent components 
of non-discretionary accruals after controlling for expected growth as in McNichols(2000).  
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However, the attempt at specifying specific accruals tests has failed repeatedly in the literature. 
Additionally, even the use of annual year end data as in our study has to contend with clustered 
announcements at the end of the year and it is difficult to assume a parametric relation even after 
specifying different bases to tackle event contamination and it is virtually impossible to isolate the 
effects of specific accruals except for that may be argued in theory. For example, changes in 
receivables are specific to the credit policy (easy or discriminatory or other generous) adopted by 
each firm and even price changes of the product may show up in higher sales and higher 
discretionary accruals.   
Kothari, Mizik and Roychowdhury (2015) process the available models for discretionary accruals 
and real activity manipulation to affect the causality in valuation of pre-SEO companies’ (IPO) 
valuation. Similarly, the use of this earnings management analysis will be useful in discovering 
valuation issues prior to a firm planning higher inorganic investments i.e. large public and private 
mergers and acquisitions (Mao and Renneboog, 2015).  However, issues of valuation are more 
affected by real activity manipulation, namely by influencing consistent opportunistic reduction of 
intangible expenses and SGA expenses prior to IPO. Investors’ trust is more affected by accrual-
based earnings management (Hewitt, Hodge and Pratt, 2015).  
Discretion available to managers allows us to account for the Basu asymmetric timeliness 
coefficient (Ball, Kothari and Nikolaev, 2013) or the negative coefficient to bad news in earnings 
that allows for slower digestion of negative earnings impact news that ties in with accounting 
conservatism.  
Dechow et al. (2012) reinforces a negative correlation in discretionary accruals time series as they 
are expected to be reversed. Richardson et al. (2005) describe earnings persistence as a criterion 
for discerning whether accruals are reliable or not. This implies that firms may be marked as 
unreliable after having used opportunistic accruals to trump up earnings as reversals ensue. On the 
other hand, this increases the tendency of firms to engage in downward earnings management as 
they understate earnings in good times and that allows them to smooth earnings during crises. We 
analyze our sample to affirm if specific firms can be seen to be implementing downward earnings 
management or if they are engaging primarily in opportunistic accruals management.  
Earnings management motivations are frequently explained in agency theory.  This includes 
Earnings forecasts and earnings surprises, differentiating positive and negative surprises and the 
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management propensity to influence bonuses and manage bad news slowly as measured in the 
Basu asymmetry coefficient (Ball, Kothari and Nikolaev, 2013). 
Earnings management will depend on institutional ownership (Ghosh, 2011), the presence of 
international investors, accounting conservatism, impairment and loss events, and analyst forecasts 
or management guidance. Dechow et al. (2011) and others use the list of SEC enforcement actions 
to identify a sample of firms engaging in accruals misstatements and try to predict characteristics 
of misstating firms using F-statistics to get rid of chances of Type I errors in the model.    
Li (2019), Hsieh et al. (2018) and Lewellen and Resutek (2019) again emphasize for our paper the 
importance of accrual-based earnings management in unravelling corporate governance because 
of the low persistence of accruals and their direct linkages with managerial incentives and 
managerial background while Ozili (2018) and Dayanandan and Sra (2018) confirm effective 
procyclical governance using accrual based earnings management and their obvious value 
relevance. 
Working Capital Investments  
As mentioned earlier, the formulation for Accruals in Equation (2) in Section 4.3 refers the 
Working Capital Investment of the firm. As such, this formulation is likely to be highly skewed in 
growth times as firms rely on Working Capital Investments to increase the PPE investments of the 
firm. This is additionally evidenced strongly in our sample of Indian firms.   
Banking Firms  
Oosterbosch (2000) presents a comprehensive literature review of Earnings management practices 
in banking firms and tests findings of earnings management thru Loan loss provisions after the 
introduction of IFRS in small and large banks. Banks valuation and reporting models specify 
regulatory effects and a reliability of operating profit measures. We therefore rely on banks’ 
specific accrual measures from the literature in Loan loss provisions, and trading gains.  In a 
regulator motivated study, Meisel (2013) applies an industry specific model to banks and compares 
for valuation effects in banking firms planning mergers and merger defense. Ahmed, Takeda and 
Thomas (1999) find no expected earnings management effect in banks and explains the negative 
correlation of Loan loss provisions to future earnings and stock returns allowing banks to focus on 
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Loan loss provisions (countercyclical and not pro-cyclical as expected in earnings management) 
for capital management.    
Event Studies  
Earnings management motivations and information flows relationships are also a frequently tested 
subject in the literature. These models rely on event  study based parametric and non-parametric 
tests to establish relationship between derivatives pricing, analyst coverage and the accruals 
anomaly to investigate relationships with accruals.  Meeting expectations on a regular basis may 
for example, improve abnormal returns in calibrated event studies. Also, for companies forced to 
produce a negative earnings surprise, there may be a motivation to manage earnings downward 
and create cookie jar reserves for future periods. This has been explored by Dechow et al. (2011, 
2012) for firms reporting zero or negative earnings, showing up as a very asymmetric distribution 
around 0 earnings. Firms positively manipulating earnings also end up over investing in the period 
with higher discretionary accruals.  
Earnings management was also definitively changed for cross listed firms after the introduction of 
SOX in the US in 2002.  Also, audit firms are seen to increase their fee around increasing earnings 
management. MNCs in India (Ghosh, 2011) are seen to employ international auditors with lower 
monitoring resulting in higher discretionary accruals. Earnings management will thus depend on 
institutional ownership, the presence of international investors, accounting conservatism, 
impairment and loss events, and analyst forecasts or management guidance. More importantly it 
has significant linkages in the Corporate Governance literature and a significant indicator of the 
Corporate Governance score of the candidate firms.  
We complete the literature review as we began with another application of discretionary accruals 
in the earnings management literature with Barth et al. (2014) that attempt a market model based 
earnings transparency measure, where they find in favor of a lower cost of capital reward for firms 
that can prove earnings transparency. The new IFRS mandate in the meanwhile is expected to 
homogenize Financial reporting completely after its launch in 2019 and may necessitate a 
reevaluation of any firm specific measures and traditional earnings management (Barth et al., 
2012).  However, Oosterbosch(2000) confirms that sophisticated earnings management users in 
large banks continue to prefer earnings management to retain investor trust. 
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 3. Hypotheses 
We propose and evaluate the following hypotheses for Indian firms employing accruals-based 
earnings management  
Hypothesis 1: Crisis events will expose firms’ specific earnings management strategies. Proactive 
strategies (Performance measurement) can be compared with Reactive earnings management 
(Opportunistic accruals). 
If there is proactive earnings management, there may be no change in the firms’ EM strategies.  
It is reasonable to expect that the reversal of accruals to force ill prepared firms into a reactive 
crisis of earnings in their post crisis reports in FY 2007 and FY 2012. The low persistence of 
accruals (Lewellen and Resutek, 2019) link accrual-based earnings management directly to 
managerial incentives (Ahmed, 2015) as higher earnings management expose manipulation. Also, 
as Li (2019) discovers, accrual and real based earnings management are complementary to each 
other. 
Hypothesis 2: Indian firms will reflect Earnings Management strategies more suited to growth 
firms.  
Crisis response will be heightened in Indian firms because of the pressures of growth. Hsieh et al. 
(2018) finds in an emerging market sample that the firms’ executive leadership defines its earnings 
management levels effectively moderated by the presence of founders. Emerging markets in Asia 
therefore balance between curbing earnings manipulation because of the educational backgrounds 
of top management whilst managing the trade off with entrenchment hypothesis 
Hypothesis 3: Both Banking firms and Non-Financial firms will exhibit complementary earnings 
management strategies. Banking firms will respond with more sophisticated Earnings management 
as adverse credit decisions lead the onset of a crisis. 
In the presence of basic data on Loan Loss provisions and trading gains on securities the analysis 
shows the presence of earnings management in the financial firms (tested in only Banking firms) 
as being more sophisticated than that in the sample of Non- financial firms. Elleuch and Taktak 
(2015) decode earnings management in banks as regulations change while Ozili (2018) and 
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Othman and Mersni (2014) trace the macroeconomic cycles and efficient and effective earnings 
management by banks using Discretionary LLPs. 
Hypothesis 4: Indian firms primarily engage in Performance measurement using discretionary 
accruals if they have the requisite size.  
As tested in Guay, Kothari and Watts (1996) henceforth GKW, the discretionary accrual amounts 
and their relationship to earnings can be used to tie in the firms’ use of discretionary accruals as 
Performance Measurement vis a vis Opportunistic Accruals management hypothesis. 
This will be shown by the presence of a negative correlation in the discretionary accruals in the 
pre-crisis and post crisis years.  
However, this might be significant evidence of Opportunistic Accruals management if the 
direction of the accruals is higher in the post crises year. Earnings management in emerging 
markets with robust markets and investor protection regimes is significantly affected by growth 
and management skills (Hsieh et al. 2018) 
4. Experimental Design  
4.1 Sample Selection 
The Nifty 100 index constituents form the sample of firms in the study. The popular Nifty 50 and 
Nifty junior 50 indices together account for the Nifty 100 firms. These firms are spread across 12 
sectors and as for March 2015 account for 78% of the free float of the National Stock Exchange 
in India. After excluding other financial firms, we end up with 76 firms and 12 banks and calculate 
the accrual measures based on the Modified jones model weighted by total assets at the beginning 
of year to take care of endogeneity and minimize size effects in the pooled regression. For each 
firm we get Financial statement data from the Bloomberg database for the period 2001-2015.  
Some firms need to be excluded for non -availability of key Financial statement data such as M&M 
(receivables) and Bharat Forge (total assets). As Firm years are separated later based on crises 
events in 2001, 2006 and 2011, we use Financial data as available only when completely available 
for both pre and post crisis years. Other firm years are collated together to compute the OLS 
coefficients in (1). 
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We neglect the small impact of taxes in the calculation of Total Accruals in the data. Apart from 
the effect being small in size, most tax aligned manipulation of earnings is likely to be included in 
real activity Earnings management and we concern ourselves with Accruals based earnings 
management. 
We also appreciate our limitation of this study in that in the style of Bartov (2003) we would prefer 
using 10-Q and equivalent Indian disclosures to closely track earnings management. However, it 
is also true that Earning management is intuitive to the firms’ management and usually advantages 
from earnings seasonality and priorities. Thus, an experiment design with quarterly statements 
may not be ideal for Earnings management analysis. 
4.2 Data 
The 76 Non-Financial firms yield a total of 692 eligible firm years.  
As 2001 is usually the first available year in the Bloomberg data files, we are unable to use the 
crisis year in 2001 in the specification. The scaling requires last year’s Total Assets to form the 
variables. This is because the development of the Accrual model realizes the previous years’ 
closing balance sheet value (Total Assets) as the best company datum to weight Accruals and 
Revenue and Property Plant and Equipment data assigned in Equation (2). 
We calculate weighted data for Total Accruals and the two Independent variables for the 692 firm 
years using the values of Revenues, Receivables, Current Assets, Current Liabilities, Cash and 
equivalent, Short term debt, Total assets (t-1 year) as well as PP&E, directly available from 
Bloomberg or within reasonable permutations from available fields without restating earnings or 
applying further approximations. This meant sometimes computing the value of Total Assets for 
all years based on Net Current Assets + Total Non-Current Assets. 
The sample of 692 Firm years has corresponding 109 crisis observation pairs, which are tested for 
difference in discretionary accruals using Paired t tests. The crises reactions can be separately 
analyzed for 2012(2011) and 2007(2006) with 64 and 45 pairs respectively.  
Interestingly at least 191 firm years show negative Total accruals even when a -10% TA level is 
used, signifying a heavy reliance of large growth companies in the index. These growth companies 
habitually rely on Current Liability accruals and significant PPE investments even though the 
amount of intangibles is increasing that may also be invested in Corporate Governance.  
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In our sample of Banks, the available data set of 131 firm years, we collate different OLS data on 
Loan Loss provisions scaled by total loans, non-performing Loans (also scaled by Total Loans) 
(which we drop for intractability), Income before Taxes and Loss provisions scaled by Total assets 
(IBITt )as well as trading gains scaled by the IBIT. This data correspondingly has 20 crisis 
observations, (20 pre crises year and 20 Post crises years). 
The Fiscal year returns for the Nifty 100 members are taken corresponding to available Financial 
Statement data. Where such correspondence is not available, we are left with 668 eligible firm 
years for the decomposition models of Fiscal year returns.  
Descriptive statistics of the data series in each case from the estimation of Discretionary accruals, 
to impact of Crises years on Discretionary accruals and Non-Discretionary accruals estimates are 
presented with the results from each stage of the design. 
4.3 Methodology 
The Modified Jones model in DSS95 is implemented as under: 
TAt = 1(1/At-1) + 1(REVt - RECt) /A t-1 +2(PPEt) /At-1   ……… (1) 
TAt = (CAt – CLt – CASHt + STDEBTt – DEPTNt)/ASSETt-1  ……… (2) 
Firm years are collated together to compute the OLS coefficients in (1). 
The Non-discretionary accruals are directly estimated in the above form as the total estimable 
accruals and the OLS regression across firm years yields errors as Discretionary accruals. 
The Discretionary accruals separated from the Modified Jones (1991) formulation as error can thus 
be estimated. 
The small impact of taxes in the calculation of Total Accruals in the data is neglected. 
The study follows annual March fiscal announcements. Informativeness of Financial reporting has 
not decreased in the period of 2001-2015 which data we employ in the analysis.  
Estimation of discretionary accruals have been assessed for Power and relevance variously by 
Dechow et al. (2011); Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) and Kothari, Mizik and Roychowdhury 
(2015). While Non-discretionary accruals relate to the operating characteristics of the business, 
discretionary accruals reverse out after a few years. Corrections to the modified jones models in 
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the literature by Dechow et al. (2011) incorporating reversals in the very next year and by use of 
matched firms by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) were found to be exceedingly complex 
without additional benefits of power or reliability. As already discussed in the literature, other 
mechanisms to separate accruals also frequently underperform the Modified Jones model and thus 
the same as typified in equations (1) and (2) is primarily used on the sample here to separate 
discretionary accruals. The reversal of discretionary accruals in fact improves the statistical 
validity of the test and improves its power over a larger sample.  
For the crises pairs, a dummy variable PARTt is employed.  The results of the regression using the 
dummy variable PARTt in a single regression misspecifies the results and we end up with 
increasing non-discretionary accruals in the crisis year.  
As many as 32 firm years out of 64 represent firms increasing their total accruals during the crises 
year. When a separate regression is run for prior and post years models to capture different Non-
discretionary accrual and estimate back the DA from them as error, we find the increased accruals 
showing as expected in the padded Discretionary accruals.  
This difference is tested using a paired t test of these firm years. The Discretionary accruals 
estimated in the overall model are written back into the data and estimated accruals from the OLS 
regression used for Non-Discretionary accruals. These Non- discretionary accruals and 
Discretionary accruals are currently used to estimate their impact on Fiscal year earnings in the 
style of GKW (1996). These Discretionary accruals can be utilized for computing any impact on 
returns in follow on research using the discretionary accruals reported in this analysis 
As tested in the literature, the discretionary accrual amounts and their relationship to earnings can 
be used to tie in the firms’ use of discretionary accruals as Performance Measurement vis a vis 
Opportunistic Accruals management hypothesis. As per Performance measurement hypothesis,  
We analyze our sample to affirm if specific firms can be seen to be implementing downward 
earnings management as per the Performance Measurement hypothesis or if they are engaging 
primarily in opportunistic accruals management. The presence of Cookie jar reserves can be 
cogently tested in subsamples of large firms and also in industry wise measures as industry firms 
may likely follow similar management mantras.  
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The sample for banks is run for earnings management on cash profits before accruals and loan loss 
provisions. Loan loss provisions represent by far the most important discretionary accrual on Bank 
balance sheets ad are used directly. Thus the study operates on scaled LLPt as a ratio of overall 
Loans measured in a regression with two IVs, scaled Trading Gains (scaled by EBIT), TRADt and 
the cash profit scaled by Total Assets of the firm of the same year), IBITt. We also use Bloomberg 
data for NPLs and Trading gains as well as Tier I capital ratios to measure the extent of use of 
discretionary accruals.  
On the non-financial sample we run a test of correlations between non-discretionary accruals and 
discretionary accruals. A negative correlation specifies an under reaction to the economic shock 
in the performance measurement hypothesis and conforms to the opportunistic accruals 
management hypothesis for firms that are forcing earnings upward.   
All OLS regressions are run using robust Standard errors in Stata. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Preliminary observations of the Non-Financial sample 
A simple analysis of the pre-crisis accruals shows a lack of earnings management savvy in Indian 
public corporations as they prefer to depend on  next year’s growing sales instead of creating any 
distance between them and a crisis with a large negative dependence on the increasing sales (-
24.7%). Firms also show more negative dependence on PPE investments that continues with highly 
significant coefficients in both pre crisis (-6.8%) and post crisis years (-8.0%). However, in the 
post crisis years it becomes more discernible that negative accruals are related to higher Capital 
Expenditure and hence growth. This is primarily because the Crisis year forces managements to 
invest a more significant proportion of their Total accruals in Discretionary cookie jar reserves. 
However the Sales coefficient is not found to be significant in either regression. The situation is 
more a reflection of Corporate Governance practices and the larger availability of Cash in each of 
the firm’s balance sheets balancing larger supplier liabilities. 
5.2 Results from the Non-Financial Sample 
We present the results of the OLS regressions in Table 1. The DA measurements are included in 
the results of the pooled regression using robust Standard errors.  
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The F Statistic of the test is 12 and the PPE variable is significant at greater than 99% level with 
an R2 from the Sales growth and PPE variables of 3.38%  
The relation for estimating back NDA and separating DA is thus 
NDA = 0.004074   -.013541   * Sales -.077697   * PPEt       ……… (3) 
The Post crises relation shows a better significance of Sales and a positive coefficient on the same, 
with significantly higher Discretionary accruals  
TA (post) = -.005196 + .040315 * Sales - .073017   * PPEt       ……… (4) 
TA (pre) =    .083543 - 0.249178 * Sales - .095347   * PPEt          ……… (5) 
Separated pre crisis years show perfect dependence with Sales (t=4.47) and almost 0 Discretionary 
accruals. For the pooled results the Perfect correlation with PPE is restored in the post crisis years 
as the firms get caught for bleeding all the cash in booking higher sales at the top of the pre-crisis 
boom. 
Discretionary Accruals rise by 29% of Assets in the year following as firms show Opportunistic 
accruals to claw earnings at level using accruals-based earnings management apart from any real 
activity-based earnings management not measured here. Paired t-test statistic is 9.15. 
Additional confirmation of negative correlation between Non-discretionary and Discretionary 
accruals at -10% shows a presence of Performance measurement accruals. However, negative 
accruals between pre and post crisis data with increase in post crisis accruals show preponderance 
of opportunistic accruals management in the post crisis year.   
Thus, we show that Crisis expose the presence of Performance measurement in Indian firms’, yet 
there is evidence of continuing Opportunistic accruals management. The effects of growth are 
unable to mask the firms’ choice of earnings management. As we see below, Banking firms 
however respond more proactively, and accruals reduce in the post crisis years. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
In Table 2 we try and see if there is an industry wise difference visible in the computed 
discretionary accruals and further research is merited. Accounting guidelines may have changed 
over the years resulting in reduced overall opportunities for earnings management. However, the 
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corresponding likely increase of intangible assets during the period would correspond to some 
increasing opportunity for earnings management. The dominant effect of the latter is visible in 
Table 2 where increased R&D expenditure for Industrials and Healthcare that can be inferred from 
the objects of these industries shows up in significantly high positive Discretionary accruals for 
similar PPE levels. Information technology firms, Consumer Discretionary firms, Consumer 
staples firms and Energy firms show consistently minimal discretionary accruals from the focus 
on operational efficiencies in the business. Non-Discretionary accruals are more or less consistent 
around industry groups at 0.037 - 0.042 other than the higher NDE in the nine Telecom and Utility 
firms. Industry level analysis is left for follow on research with a larger data set.  
[Insert Table 2 here]  
5.3 Results from the Financial Sample 
The sample of Financial firms yields significant relationships in OLS regressions with each 
independent variable at the 95% level.  The results are presented in Table 3. 
The LLP increase with EBIT by a coefficient of 8.1% and decrease with reported trading gains by 
0.11%, both significant at >99.99% level. In the combined regression using PARTt in the 
regression as Dummy with Trading Gains and EBIT, the constant term remains significant as 
expected. The EBIT term is significant (t=2.92) but the Trading gains terms with the negative 
coefficient is not significant (t-=1.15). The Dummy Variable for Crisis is not found to be 
significant. We do not attach significance to the combined regression because of paucity of data. 
However, for the post crisis sample we are unable to retrieve any significant relationships in the 
chosen variables. There is a decrease in the LLP in both crisis years at a confidence level under 
90%. However, in the pre-crisis sample again, we note that the accruals, LLPt are significantly 
related to each of the chosen IVs, Trading Gains and the Profit. Banking firms are also better 
practitioners of Earnings management given better tools of Earnings management for them. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
6. Conclusions 
The paper shows the strong impact of earnings management in managing crisis year financial 
reporting. 
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The ability of firms to grow a base of discretionary accruals in the growth environment lies in the 
ability of firms to disconnect working capital investments as represented by the accruals here in 
from investments for Sales. This also stresses firm balance sheets in later years as these 
discretionary accruals reverse themselves.  
7. Possible Implications 
Indian firms might benefit from adopting transparent Corporate Governance measures that restrict 
a management’s ability to use accruals opportunistically and focus on effecting investor trust. This 
might reflect in a more widespread adoption of downward earnings management.  
As challenges from the Global Financial crisis translate to more channeled flows of Foreign Direct 
Investment, India stands to benefit from harmonized Financial reporting and investors would 
support businesses that adopt a proactive Performance based Earnings Management strategy 
Investors would respond negatively to further volatility in earnings when faced by a crisis and this 
may erode Investor trust and confidence. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1 
Table 1a: Descriptive statistics for the Accrual data for the CNX Nifty 100 from FY2002-FY2015. All data is presented as the ratio of 
previous year's assets to normalise the data. Only non-financial firms are included in this part. 
 
  
Variable no. of firms Firm years 5% value 95% value Mean SD Variable Description   
TA 76 743 -0.305975 0.187788 
-
0.039236 0.185191  TA/A(t-1)   
Sales 76 743 -0.060728 0.884662 0.281740 0.421427 Rev(t) - Rec(t) / A(t-1) 
PPE 76 743 0.110931 1.017761 0.508322 0.415155  PPE(t) / A(t-1)  
PART 76 232 0.000000 1.000000 0.500000 0.501081 There are 116 crisis year pairs for 
2006 and 2011 as exit years 
NDE 76 743 -0.089340 -0.009870 
-
0.042870 0.034039 Estimated from (1)  
DA 76 743 -0.238025 0.239569 0.003633 0.181962 Estimated as residual from (1)  
          
Table 1b: NDE Estimation             
  All firm years Pre-Crisis Post Crisis       
Sales -0.013541 -0.249178***  0.040315       
 (.036115) (.090424) (.098782)       
PPE -0.077697*** -0.095347 -0.073017**       
 (.021978) (.077220) (.031090)       
Constant  0.004074  0.083543 -0.005196       
 (.013298) (.046379) (.025762)       
          
R – squared 0.0346 0.1454 0.0278       
F stat 6.58 5.3 3.61       
Observations 743 116 116       
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No. of Firms (Pooled) 76 76 76       
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
 
  
 
 
TABLE 2 
 
Table 2: Accrual data for the CNX Nifty 100 from FY2002-FY2015 sorted by Industry groups. All data is presented as the ratio of previous year's assets to 
normalise the data. Only non-financial firms are included in this part.  
Industry no. of firms Firm years Ave TA Ave Net Sales Ave PPE Ave NDE Ave DA s.e +/- 
Consumer Discretionary (12 members) 11 110 -0.043116 0.425782 0.444559 -0.039274 -0.38% 1.72% - 
Consumer Staples (11 members) 11 128 -0.055253 0.376017 0.494137 -0.042675 -1.26% 1.97% - 
Energy (9 members) 9 93 -0.046445 0.284913 0.465876 -0.039574 -0.69% 1.40% - 
Health Care (9 members) 9 102 0.004376 0.169818 0.486620 -0.040080 4.45% 1.84% + 
Industrials (8 members) 8 62 -0.010539 0.269683 0.433760 -0.036909 2.64% 2.19% + 
Information Technology (6 members) 6 67 -0.019291 0.309660 0.302576 -0.027017 0.77% 3.20% + 
Materials (13 members) 13 143 -0.031380 0.215889 0.550565 -0.045540 1.42% 1.38% + 
Telecommunication Services (4 members) 4 28 -0.146589 0.132401 0.858233 -0.068839 -7.77% 1.57% - 
Utilities (5 members) 5 45 -0.070816 0.151019 0.884720 -0.071096 0.03%   + 
  76 778               
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TABLE 3 
 
Table 3a: Descriptive statistics for the Banking firms in CNX Nifty 100 from FY2005-FY2015. Each of the selected variables are normalised using their 
effective counterpart in Assets. With 12 banking firms there are only 40 Crisis observations in the period 
 
  
 
 
 
Variable no. of firms Firm years 5% value 95% value Mean SD Variable Description    
LLP 12 129 0.000847 0.020558 0.008057 0.006003 Loan loss provisions are normalised by the 
size of the Loan Book 
 
EBIT 12 128 0.003273 0.041591 0.020088 0.012047 Income before Income Taxes and Loss 
Provisions (IBITLP) by Total Assets (Size)  
TRAD 12 129 0.000000 0.588793 0.258746 0.571684 Trading gains normalised by IBIT   
PART 12 129 0.000000 1.000000 0.147287 0.355773 There are 20 crisis year pairs for 2006 and 
2011 as exit years. To improve data, all pre 
crisis years have been counted and only 
post crisis is computed in 20 obs 
 
           
Table 1b: LLP relation estimation                
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 QREG Post Crisis 1 Post Crisis 2 Post Crisis 3    
EBIT -0.1377126***  0.1118899**  0.0570447**  0.1343431   0.1018543    
 (.0427655)  (.0456587) (.0243844) (.1088873)  (.1300189)    
TRAD  -0.0019106** -0.001265  0.0000459  -0.0052914 -0.0028783    
    (.077220) (.0009623) (.0005139)  (0.0048855) (.0059364)    
PART   -0.0022846 -0.0015534**       
   (0.0014515) (0.0007752)       
Constant 
 
0.0053214*** 
 
0.0085516*** 
 
0.0065091***  0.0009358  0.003672 -0.005196 0.0045926    
 (.0010007)  (.0005731) (.0011987) (.0006402) (.0021607) (.025762) (.0029143)    
           
Adj R -squared 0.0687 0.0255 0.0811 0.0643 0.0822 0.0612 0.0955    
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F stat 10.37 4.35 4.74  1.52 1.17 0.84    
Observations 129 129 129 128 19 20 19    
No. of Banks (Pooled) 12 12 12 12 12 12 12    
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
QREG: Quantile regression Models 1-3 are linear regressions Adj R2  is not reported in post crisis models/QREG   
LLP relations are significant for regressions of pre crisis paired observations(20) as well, and the t-test testing for significant different 
between precrisis and post crisis is not significant  with t=-1.21 
   
   
           
           
 
 
 
